2012年5月23日
梁振英：「拉布」
打開報章，滿眼大字標題幾乎都是「拉布」二字；的確，近日全城最熱門的話題非「拉布」莫屬。
今日，《明報》發布委託香港大學民意研究計劃對新政府架構重組建議所作的民意調查顯示，較多市民不贊成用拉布阻礙架構重組建議在7 月1 日前通過，有關報道說：
「當被問到有立法會議員表示可能透過拉布阻止政府改組，市民是否贊成時，45.8%受訪者表示反對，遠高於表示贊成的17.6%及表示中立的27.2%。這個調查結果反映，較多市民不贊成用拉布阻政府改組。」
與過往政府架構改組的情况一樣，新政府架構改組的建議在立法會的政制事務委員會和決議案小組委員會討論是正常程序，只是，今次的建議除政制事務委員會外，房屋、民政和資訊科技及廣播等事務委員會同樣要開會討論。
讓我把事實再說一遍，2007 年政府架構改組涉及8 個決策局，其中環境運輸及工務局、房屋及規劃地政局重組為環境局、發展局、運輸及房屋局；衛生福利及食物局、經濟發展及勞工局、工商及科技局重組為食物及衛生局、商務及經濟發展局、勞工及福利局；政制事務局重組為政制及內地事務局；重組民政事務局職能等，變動不可謂不大，但立法會當時只有政制事務委員會召開會議討論，其他事務委員會，包括房屋事務委員會並沒有進行討論。
今天，我們的改組除增設副司長的職位分擔政務司長和財政司長的工作，以強化跨政策範疇的統籌工作外，只涉及4 個決策局，包括增設文化局；將商務及經濟發展局改組為科技及通訊局和工商及產業局；將發展局與運輸及房屋局改組為房屋規劃地政局和運輸及工務局。以房屋政策為例，也僅是把房屋規劃地政局還原而已，但房屋事務委員會卻要召開會議討論。
想深一層，各個事務委員會紛紛召開會議討論改組建議，是不是「拉布」的一種？
我們固然尊重議員的選擇，我和候任特首辦的同事亦會竭力配合議員的工作，但現實是，如今距離7 月1 日只餘少於個半月的時間，多個事務委員會開會後，我們是否仍有足夠時間通過種種所須程序呢？「用拉布阻政府改組」，
對市民有什麼好處？
重組政府架構只是希望改善過去做得不足的地方，希望能夠為市民提供更好的服務，提高施政成效，改變社會發展和經濟發展停滯不前的現狀。
市民對新政府是有期望的，只有通過實踐，才能證明成效。套用上述民調的說法， 「用拉布阻政府改組」，對市民有什麼好處？讓新政府的團隊在7 月1 日全體上任就位， 「急市民所急」，提供更好的服務，對市民又有什麼壞處？
（小標題及黑體重點由編者所加）作者是候任行政長官
明報，觀點，A32，2012-05-23
丹·布朗：基督教中有什麼原創的東西嗎？
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| 翼盤Winged sun |
「這毫不相關嘛！」蘭登在解釋墳墓朝東的原因的時候，一名女生衝口而出。「基督徒怎麼會想讓他們的墳墓面朝朝陽？我們在討論基督教……而不是太陽崇拜！」
蘭登嘴裡嚼著蘋果微笑著走到黑板前。「希茨羅特先生！」他喊道。
一個在後排打盹的年輕人猛地坐直了身子。「什麼！叫我嗎？」
蘭登指著牆上一幅關於文藝復興時期藝術的海報。「跪在上帝面前的那個人是誰？」
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| In traditional Christian iconography, saints are often depicted as having halos, which is a symbol of their holiness. Note that Judas is depicted without a halo. （URL） |
「是因為他頭上有一個光環吧？」
「太棒了，那這個金色的光環讓你想到什麼了嗎？」
希茨羅特噗哧一下笑了。「對！我們上學期學過的埃及的東西。那些……坶……翼盤（Winged sun）！[1]」
「謝謝你，希茨羅特，回去睡覺吧。」蘭登又轉過身對全班說：「光環跟基督教中的許多符號一樣．也是從古埃及太陽崇拜的信仰中藉來的。基督教裡太陽崇拜的例子俯拾即是。」
「對不起，你說什麼？」前排的那個女生說道，「我一直去教堂做禮拜，但就是沒見到那麼多太陽崇拜！」
「真的嗎？你們在十二月二十五日這天慶祝什麼？」
「聖涎節啊。慶祝耶穌基督的誕生。」
「不過，根據《聖經》的記載，基督是在三月出生的，那麼我們在十二月末慶祝的是什麼呢？」
沒人吭聲。
蘭登微微一笑。「伙計們，十二月二十五號是古代異教徒不可征服的太陽神的節日——恰好就在冬至這一天。就是在這個慶祝的時刻，太陽返回，白晝一天天變長。」
蘭登又咬了一口蘋果。
「征服宗教，」他繼續說道，「通常會採用現成的節日，這樣，宗教的改變不至於太讓人震驚。這叫做嬗變，可以幫人們適應新的宗教信仰。信徒還記著同樣的神聖的日期，在同樣神聖的地方祈禱，使用同樣的象徵……他們只不過換了一個不同的神而已。」
此時前面這位女生看上去怒不可遏。「你這是在暗示基督教不過是某種……重新包裝的日神崇拜！」
.jpg) |
| Feathered Serpent heads cover the Temple of the Feathered Serpent in Teotihuacan.（URL） |
這個女孩怒目而視。「那麼，基督教中有什麼原創的東西嗎？」
「在任何一種組合而成的宗教裡都幾乎沒有什麼真正原創的東西。宗教不是從無開始的，它們互相吸取養料形成自身，現代宗教是一種拼貼……一種被同化的歷史記錄，記錄了人類探求對神性的理解的過程。」
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| Roman marble colossal head of Zeus, 2nd century AD (URL) |
蘭登微微一笑。「早期皈依基督教的信徒拋棄了他們以前的神祗——異教諸神，羅馬眾神，希臘諸神，太陽神，密特拉神，等等——他們問教會他們新的基督教上帝看上去像什麼，教會很聰明地在所有文字記載的歷史中選了最讓人敬畏最具有權威……而且也是人所周知的面孔。」
希茨羅特看上去滿腹狐疑。「一個白須飄飄的老人？」
蘭登指著牆上古代諸神的分級圖。圖的最頂上坐著一位白須飄然的老者。「宙斯（Zeus）看起來眼熟嗎？」
課恰好在預定的時間內結束了。
註釋：
[1]翼盤，古埃及象徵太陽神的標誌．由放在張開的翅膀間的圓盤組成。
[2]猶希邁羅斯，公元前三世紀的古希臘神話作家，他認為神是由英雄人物或戰爭勝利者演化而成。
摘錄自丹·布朗：《天使與魔鬼》，標題和配圖為編者所加。
2012年5月22日
The Washington Post: Negotiations over dissident Chen Guangcheng offered rare glimpse into how China’s leadership operates, U.S. officials say
Negotiations over dissident Chen Guangcheng offered rare glimpse into how China’s leadership operates, U.S. officials say
By William Wan, Published: May 20
The decision that would launch one of the most intense and improbable negotiations in the history of U.S.-China relations was made in the space of hours — and it was sparked by a series of phone calls to the American Embassy.
Chen Guangcheng, the blind Chinese dissident, was somewhere in the sprawling edges of Beijing on Wednesday, April 25. His foot was broken in several places from a daring getaway from house arrest three days earlier, and his leg was beginning to swell. According to the activists who placed the initial calls, he was moving from place to place to avoid detection.
He was pleading for shelter.
The request hit the embassy like a rocket, setting off a flurry of secure calls among officials in Beijing and senior State Department officials in Washington. They weighed various scenarios, the possible diplomatic fallout with the Chinese, and the consequences for high-level meetings planned for the following week between Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton and China’s top leaders.
The name Fang Lizhi quickly came up. The last Chinese dissident U.S. officials were known to have ushered into the embassy, in 1989, Fang had remained stuck behind its walls for more than a year, exacerbating friction between the United States and China.
With Chen, the embassy had been told there was a narrow window of opportunity because of his need to keep moving. Senior White House officials were briefed. Then Clinton relayed her ultimate decision to the embassy: Bring him in.
Talks with the Chinese began four days later.
“When we proceeded, we did it with clear eyes about what we were getting into,” said a senior administration official involved in the process, which culminated Saturday with Chen’s arrival in the United States.
For weeks, U.S. officials have kept secret many of the sensitive details about their negotiations over Chen’s fate. But with the 40-year-old lawyer safely aboard a plane Saturday, senior administration officials described extensively for the first time their dealings with the Chinese — how they struck the first deal only to have it fall apart, and how the negotiations almost collapsed again.
The officials, all of whom spoke on the condition of anonymity, detailed their efforts in the midst of continuing criticism by Republicans and some human rights groups over their handling of the crisis. Those critics argue that U.S. officials were too trusting of the Chinese and failed to secure hard guarantees — assertions Obama administration officials refute.
Diplomacy with China is often complicated by its government’s opaque nature, layers of bureaucracy, rule by the Communist Party and sometimes puzzling decision-making process.
But those involved in the negotiations said the high-stakes talks over Chen offer a rare glimpse into how China’s leadership operates in real time — under considerable internal and external pressures.
The Chinese Embassy did not respond to requests for comment for this story.
Two unidentified men
The negotiation room at the Foreign Ministry compound in East Beijing was set up with two long tables, each with a microphone. Elaborate Chinese art hung on the walls.
He was pleading for shelter.
The request hit the embassy like a rocket, setting off a flurry of secure calls among officials in Beijing and senior State Department officials in Washington. They weighed various scenarios, the possible diplomatic fallout with the Chinese, and the consequences for high-level meetings planned for the following week between Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton and China’s top leaders.
The name Fang Lizhi quickly came up. The last Chinese dissident U.S. officials were known to have ushered into the embassy, in 1989, Fang had remained stuck behind its walls for more than a year, exacerbating friction between the United States and China.
With Chen, the embassy had been told there was a narrow window of opportunity because of his need to keep moving. Senior White House officials were briefed. Then Clinton relayed her ultimate decision to the embassy: Bring him in.
Talks with the Chinese began four days later.
“When we proceeded, we did it with clear eyes about what we were getting into,” said a senior administration official involved in the process, which culminated Saturday with Chen’s arrival in the United States.
For weeks, U.S. officials have kept secret many of the sensitive details about their negotiations over Chen’s fate. But with the 40-year-old lawyer safely aboard a plane Saturday, senior administration officials described extensively for the first time their dealings with the Chinese — how they struck the first deal only to have it fall apart, and how the negotiations almost collapsed again.
The officials, all of whom spoke on the condition of anonymity, detailed their efforts in the midst of continuing criticism by Republicans and some human rights groups over their handling of the crisis. Those critics argue that U.S. officials were too trusting of the Chinese and failed to secure hard guarantees — assertions Obama administration officials refute.
The Americans were greeted at 10 a.m. on Sunday, April 29, by familiar faces from the ministry — chief among them Cui Tiankai, a diplomat they had dealt with countless times. But on either side of the Chinese diplomats were two men who did not introduce themselves and were not introduced by others.
Not until days later, with an initial deal in sight, did the Americans learn that one of them was a representative of China’s Ministry of State Security — a powerful branch in charge of foreign intelligence and counterintelligence operations. The other, the Americans later surmised, was from an unidentified branch of China’s intelligence apparatus.
On the U.S. side were six State Department officials, including Assistant Secretary Kurt Campbell, who had been brought from Washington; legal adviser Harold Koh, who happened to be in the country for a conference; and the U.S. ambassador to China, Gary Locke.
The Chinese officials — 10 in all — conferred periodically in quiet huddles, but in a show of discipline, almost none uttered a word to the Americans over the course of four days. Only Cui talked.
Many in the room had worked with Cui on numerous sensitive issues. The previous year, in fact, Cui had sat across from some of the same U.S. officials, negotiating a joint U.S.-China statement during President Hu Jintao’s last visit with Obama in Washington.
Later, in response to criticism that the Americans should have negotiated with higher-ranking officials, or with China’s powerful security branch, several U.S. officials would argue that it was not up to them to choose their negotiating partners.
Their hands were tied in other ways as well. The Chinese warned that if word leaked that Chen was at the embassy, they would respond by charging him with treason.
The first pitch
At that first meeting, the Americans proposed that the Chinese negotiate directly with Chen. Chen had made it clear in long conversations with U.S. officials that he wanted to stay in China so he could remain relevant.
If Chen planned to stay, U.S. officials reasoned, he would need to build trust with government authorities. Having Chinese officials see him in person would also confirm U.S. claims about Chen’s injuries.
But the Chinese rejected a meeting with Chen. Foreign Ministry officials refused to go to the U.S. Embassy to negotiate. And the Americans couldn’t bring Chen out without losing all leverage.
Over the course of the negotiations, the Chinese never put any proposals on the table. Their role was strictly reactive. At the end of each meeting, Cui would leave to report the latest terms to Chinese leaders. At times, he would enter the next meeting having come directly from the compound reserved for China’s highest leaders.
“We would put something forward, and were getting answers back almost immediately from the highest levels,” one senior administration official said. “I have never seen the Chinese government working this rapidly and efficiently.”
Meanwhile, the 12-hour time difference with Washington meant U.S. negotiators were getting little sleep, spending most of their night hours briefing the White House and State Department via secure lines at the embassy.
Negotiating with Chen could sometimes be as difficult as negotiating with Chinese officials. Conversations with him could be deeply moving. He often seemed fragile — a blind man with few possessions, sleeping in a small unadorned room in the barracks of the embassy. He talked of how much he missed his wife and worried about his children.
But he could pivot in an instant, displaying a steely shrewdness as he detailed the demands he wanted conveyed to Chinese officials.
Timing as leverage
U.S. officials say they soon came to realize that Clinton’s impending visit to Beijing might actually play in their favor.
Chinese negotiators had made clear they had a strong desire to resolve the issue before the upcoming Strategic and Economic Dialogue, scheduled to begin May 3.
If negotiators didn’t succeed in resolving the matter before Clinton’s arrival, the crisis could escalate, drawing in higher-ranking officials. It was one thing for career diplomats to privately hash it out in a room; it would be quite another for Clinton to address the issue directly in meetings with China’s leadership. It was clear the Chinese negotiators wanted to avoid that.
As one senior administration official put it: “At end of the day, having Hillary Clinton come in and put things very directly and say this is what we’re seeking . . . is of a different character than having a team of negotiators say it.”
The breakthrough came on the fourth day, when the Chinese agreed to bring Chen’s family to Beijing by high-speed train. It was the sign of good faith that Chen had been seeking — his wife and two children would be out of reach of the local authorities in Shandong province — and although Chen hesitated a few more times, it was his family’s safety that persuaded him to finalize a deal.
U.S. officials had gotten agreement from the Chinese that Chen would stay at a hospital for two weeks, then relocate immediately to one of seven universities, most likely the one in nearby Tianjin. After about two years in Tianjin, Chen would be able to study in the United States or, if he preferred, transfer to a New York University-sponsored program in Shanghai.
If all went according to plan, Clinton would be able to announce the terms of the agreement to the news media at the end of the upcoming conference.
A few hours after Clinton’s plane landed on Wednesday, May 2, Chen agreed to leave the embassy and reunite with his family at the hospital.
Ambassador Locke asked Chen three times whether he was sure about leaving the embassy and accepting the deal to stay in China. Chen told Locke he was ready to make a better life for himself.
A misstep
U.S. officials had negotiated maintaining access to Chen while he was at the hospital. But on the evening Chen reunited with his family, the last official remaining decided to leave, out of a sense that they desired some privacy.
It was a decision that would be endlessly scrutinized and criticized in coming days, by Chen’s supporters, by Republican lawmakers and by human rights advocates — a decision even some U.S. officials would later acknowledge was a mistake.
The Americans had provided Chen with three preprogrammed cellphones to ensure access, but they did not anticipate that he would use them in a nonstop stream of interviews over the next two days — even calling in to a congressional hearing in Washington.
Chen began telling friends and anyone he could reach that he had been abandoned and feared for his safety. Supporters and reporters descended on the hospital, prompting a crackdown by security guards.
Suddenly, the Chinese Foreign Ministry broke its silence on the case, issuing a statement in which it lambasted U.S. interference and demanded an apology.
To many outside the government, it appeared as if the Chinese were annulling the deal. But many U.S. officials who were there say that the Chinese appeared willing to follow through on the deal and would have, if Chen hadn’t changed his mind.
“To this moment there is no aspect of those understandings that they didn’t fulfill,” said one senior U.S. official, noting that the Chinese had kept their promise to open an investigation into the abuse Chen suffered and allowed him to communicate freely.
The closing pitch
By the morning of Thursday, May 3, in Beijing, it was clear there was a problem: Chen wanted to leave China.
U.S. officials realized they had underestimated the animosity of Chen’s friends and fellow dissidents toward his decision to stay, and overnight as he sat alone with his family, they had clearly persuaded him to reconsider.
By then, the conference was in full swing, and any negotiations would have to take place in the short breaks between sessions.
For the first time, U.S. officials floated the idea of Chen going to the United States. With the situation rapidly falling apart, they suggested it was the quickest path to resolution. At an afternoon meeting, Cui appeared angry as he listened to the proposal but left to convey the message to his leaders.
That night, after a full day at the conference, Clinton gave her tired and dispirited negotiating team a pep talk. They weighed the options, including allowing for a cooling-off period. But ultimately, Clinton called for a full-court press to reach an immediate solution.
Hours later, Campbell contacted Cui to tell him they needed another meeting in the morning.
Cui responded heatedly, his voice so loud it could be heard by others in the room with Campbell: “We did this once already!”
By morning, Clinton decided to raise the stakes and meet directly with Dai Bingguo, China’s senior foreign policy official. A sit-down was scheduled for 9 a.m.
Clinton opened with praise for both sides’ negotiators and their original agreement. Then she carefully framed the new proposal in terms of the first deal.
The plan all along had been for Chen to be able to study in the United States after his two years in Tianjin, she pointed out. All the United States was asking for was to move up that timetable.
She described the moment in lofty terms — as an inflection point in history that could have enormous bearing on future relations between the two countries.
Dai sat very still and, when he spoke, did so almost in a whisper.
China has done all it can, he said. He hesitated, then added that if the Americans believed more was possible, the negotiating teams could sit down again.
“I don’t want to talk to him anymore,” Cui blurted out in Chinese, gesturing toward Campbell.
Dai told Cui to try once more.
“We go out uncertain what to expect,” one official said. “What we’re waiting for is a signal.”
Breach of protocol
A glimmer of hope came not long afterward, at Clinton’s meeting with Premier Wen Jiabao.
In the middle of the meeting, as Wen and Clinton were talking, a junior Chinese officer stood up from the table and pulled Cui, China’s ambassador to Washington, Zhang Yesui, and their lieutenants from the meeting — an extraordinary breach of typical protocol.
Behind a large wall, the Chinese officials held an animated deliberation. When the officials returned to their seats, they appeared tense but slightly more confident.
After the meeting, one of them pulled Campbell aside. “Are you certain this is what he wants?” the official asked.
“We’re absolutely certain,” Campbell replied.
During a lunch break, as the State Department’s Victoria Nuland briefed reporters, a journalist handed her a BlackBerry with a news alert from Xinhua, China’s official news agency.
Chinese officials had declared that, as a Chinese citizen, Chen was free to apply to study abroad. Whether it signaled that the Chinese had fully committed to letting him go — or were simply stalling — remained unclear.
Shortly afterward, Cui met again with Campbell and three other Americans.
For a full hour, he harped on the issue of U.S. interference. Shortly afterward, Cui made his first mention of the Xinhua story.
“That’s when we knew it was a deliberate move,” one U.S. official said.
The Chinese laid out their demands. They wanted to make clear publicly that Chen was receiving no special treatment, and they needed an undefined period of time before releasing him so it did not appear as if they were caving in to outside pressure.
Most of all, they insisted the agreement was to be presented as a series of parallel and separate undertakings on both sides, not as a “deal,” or even as an “understanding.”
Cui departed with a final warning to the Americans: Don’t say anything that would force us to contradict you.
A last-minute statement
The meeting left the Americans 20 minutes before Clinton was to address reporters.
At least seven senior U.S. officials gathered around a computer to cobble together a statement.
At the news conference, as Cui had been promised, Clinton spoke in positive but general terms. Her spokeswoman released a statement describing U.S. expectations “that the Chinese Government will expeditiously process his applications” for travel documents.
After six days of nearly nonstop crisis diplomacy, there was nothing left to do but wait for word from the Chinese.
It came 15 days later, as Chen was whisked from his hospital and put on a plane to Newark.
The Washington Post
http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/negotiations-over-dissident-chen-guangcheng-offered-rare-glimpse-into-how-chinas-leadership-operates-us-officials-say/2012/05/19/gIQAxPtsbU_story.html
明報：美報﹕陳光誠「有機心」 美官談判難
美國《華盛頓郵報》昨引述了解陳光誠問題談判的內幕人士，披露了中美高層如何完成了「雙方關係史上其中一次最為緊張和最難以置信的談判」。
美方知情高官稱，陳光誠逃離山東後，於4月25日躲在北京的某角落，腳部多處骨裂，當他提出庇護要求後，在北京的美國官員與華盛頓方面作了多次秘密會談。美方考慮了多種因素，那就是與「中國的關係可能破裂，以及國務卿希拉里稍後就要訪華」。最終希拉里向美國駐華大使館下達命令，讓他進入美國駐北京使館。美國與中方的談判在4天後進行。
異見人士一晚游說 陳改初衷
中美首次談判時間是4月29日早上，中方出面的包括外交部副部長崔天凱，美方代表則包括副國務卿坎貝爾及美國駐華大使駱家輝。文章稱，美方與陳光誠本人的談判，幾乎和與中國高層的談判一樣難。「雖然陳希望見到妻子及擔憂子女的想法讓美國官員動容，但是他在表達自己向中國官員的要求時也顯示了他很有機心」。
談判了4天，中美初步協議是，陳光誠住院兩周後會前往一所大學學習，最有可能是在天津市，兩年後他可前往美國學習。在希拉里5月2日抵達北京後的幾小時，陳光誠同意離開美國大使館與家人在醫院見面。然而到了5月3日，問題出現了，那就是陳光誠希望去美國。美國官員意識到低估了陳光誠的朋友及其他異見人士對他留在中國的決定的反對聲音，就在陳光誠與家人朋友獲安排單獨相處的5月2日晚上，這些人說服他改變了主意。美國官員為陳光誠提供了三部手機，以確保能夠聯絡他。但他們想不到的是陳光誠會在未來的兩天中無間斷地接受採訪，並要求美國衆議院對此作聆訊。
崔天凱對美方希望再舉行會議談陳光誠赴美的要求感到非常不滿，國務委員戴秉國則試圖設法勸解。真正轉機出現在希拉里與溫家寶的會談期間，有中方消息傳出，陳光誠可申請前往國外留學。
不久後崔天凱與美國官員再次會談。中方提出了要求，他們希望公開表示陳光誠沒獲特殊照顧，他們在釋放他之前「需要一段時間」，這樣才不會顯示中國屈服於外來壓力。中方同時堅持說，不可以把出國安排描述成是在進行了一系列會談之後達成的「協議」。最終陳光誠成功出國。
明報，2012-05-21
http://news.sina.com.hk/news/2/1/1/2668416/1.html
環球時報社評：陳的「奇遇」是一次性大氣泡
山東臨沂盲人陳光誠星期六離開中國，當天抵達紐約，開始留學生涯。陳的事從一開始到現在僵持了很長時間，最後解決得又很「順利」。這很值得思考。
西方輿論普遍把陳光誠描述成中國的反體制「英雄」，一些人這兩天在歡呼「勝利」。而事情的真實情形要復雜得多。陳光誠的盲人身份使西方輿論很容易拿來煽情，但中國太大，太能把熱點放涼，以往不嚴肅的煽情都自生自滅了。
陳光誠被他的支持者們定義為「維權人士」。其實中國的維權人士很多，其中激烈者也不乏有之。但當初偏偏「僵」在陳光誠身上，而且越來越「僵」，中國農村基層的一起糾紛，迅速有了國際政治的味道。
各類爭議的社會事件大多在中國得到化解，但美國一些官員、人權組織及西方輿論的確從一開始就鼓勵了陳光誠的對抗姿態，中國國內也有一些人把陳的事情往僵持的方向推。一些人嘴上喊要解決，但行為卻在鼓勵擴大事態，越僵越好。
其實陳光誠的事情是一個彩色的大氣泡，破了之後什麼都沒有。中國的法律尚有不完善之處，如果這個氣泡想要證明這一點，不用它說全中國都懂。如果它要證明中國法律越來越差，或者有等於沒有，它再怎麼證明也沒用。中國是個法制根基差，但在不斷進步、完善的國家，這是陳光誠加上美國政府、國際人權組織一起喊也駁不倒的事實。
回過頭來綜合看，陳光誠的事鬧出這麼大動靜，但對中國社會穩定的實際衝擊卻很小。根本原因在於中國人對自己國家的認識總體上是成熟、穩定的。這些年不斷出有關「異見人士」的西方輿論轟動，多數中國人已經見怪不怪，有了一定免疫力。
陳光誠到美國後，對西方的宣傳價值不會比之前更高。在美國願意講「壞中國」故事的「原中國異見人士」已經有不少，再多一個也無妨。
美國一些政治人物圍繞陳光誠表了很多態，把他抬得很高，這有點像是在害他。因為那麼多「光環」戴在他的頭頂，等於「逼迫」他，要他為自己完全駕馭不了的國際政治博弈去沖鋒陷陣。
這種全球化及互聯網時代美國在中國的「救人」劇情很刺激，但它注定只能是一次性「演出」，因為在中國對信訪結果不滿並認為自己受到「迫害」的人還有很多，就全國范圍來說，不公正的判決肯定也有。如果美國真願意「施救」，他們一定很開心，但我們相信，美國駐華使館肯定不會願意成為中國最複雜一批案子的「信訪處」。
說通美國人是不可能的，但中國支持陳光誠的一些知識精英們應當有所不同。我們應共同努力，避免或減少未來出新的「陳光誠」。知識精英們應促成公眾對中國複雜性的更多理解，致力於化解矛盾和對立，而不是推動死結的形成。
相信整個中國社會，包括中國基層官員們都會因陳光誠的事情變得更成熟，對打破一些特殊的僵持更不拘一格。中國需要加快改革，而改革的要義之一，就是擴大社會的彈性，減少僵持點，以及不讓一個僵持點無限放大它的意義。
希望陳光誠本人在美國真正「留學」，在遠離祖國的地方冷靜思考過去發生的事，領悟他自己一個人為什麼有瞭如此多「奇遇」。希望他能夠在一個很容易被操縱的位置上，表現出與眾不同。
環球時報，社評，2012-05-21
http://opinion.huanqiu.com/1152/2012-05/2738122.html
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